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Tactical repertoires of mobilization and repression play an essential role in understanding 
dynamics of political violence, yet existing quantitative approaches focus primarily on intensities 
or counts of repressive actions. We focus instead on the diversity of repression, and demonstrate 
a novel method of measuring repertoires of state repression using event data. We show that more 
repressive states are likely to employ more diverse repertoires of repression, rather than 
specializing narrowly in particularly coercive tactics. We demonstrate that, globally, repertoires 
of state repression are growing less diverse over time. Finally, in the appendix, we model 
repertoires of repression across countries and over time, finding evidence of broader repertoires 
during protest and civil war, but narrower under democratic regimes and international human 
rights treaties.  
 
 

















States employ varying repertoires of repressive tactics. At times states may broaden their 
repertoires, employing a more diverse and evenly distributed array of tactics; while at other times 
they may narrow their repertoires, employing a more concentrated array of tactics instead. We 
suggest a greater empirical focus on this diversity dimension of state repression and offer a novel 
way to measure it. Our approach enables us to ask entirely new research questions: Is a higher 
level of repression associated with a few specialized tactics; or a broader repertoire of many 
tactics? Is the global diversity of repressive repertoires rising, or declining, over time? What 
country-level factors are associated with more or less diverse repertoires? 
 While the concept of repertoires is commonplace in discussions of social movements and 
dissent, few authors have explored it empirically in the context of state repression (Fariss and 
Schnakenberg, 2014; DeMeritt & Conrad, 2019). Yet studying state repertoires of repression is 
crucial given the potential strategic benefits to diversification (Horowitz, Perkoski & Potter, 
2017); the possibilities of substitution across repressive tactics (Ron, 1997, 2003; Demeritt & 
Conrad, 2019); and the substantive importance of patterns of violence beyond intensity alone 
(Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017).  
 Scholars now know a great deal about what affects levels of state repression.  However, 
we know much less about when and why states choose the breadth of tactics to employ. States 
may diversify their repertoires of repression to minimize risks and outmaneuver opponents. But 
they may also limit them; either due to the efficiency of specialization, or when constrained and 
monitored through domestic and international institutions. 
We propose a method to measure the diversity of state repressive repertoires using 
conflict event data. Such data has been widely analyzed in recent years, but primarily as event 
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counts (e.g. Brandt et al., 2011; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012) or conflict/cooperation scales (e.g. 
Goldstein & Freeman, 1990; Goldstein, 1992; Reuveny & Kang, 1996). We instead measure the 
diversity of state repression events across the type of tactic employed. For any given number of 
state repression events, the diversity of tactics employed ranges from small (all events of a single 
type) to large (many different types represented in roughly equal proportion).  
 This measurement strategy proves highly informative. The diversity of state repressive 
repertoires is strongly and positively associated with existing measures of state repression, such 
that more repressive states employ more diverse repertoires. However, for many specific 
countries, our measure exhibits greater responsiveness to key events such as democratic 
transitions, election violence, or major protests, than do existing standards-based measures of 
repression. Our measure also has clear advantages over a simple count of repression events, 
which may be misleading due to the exponential growth in available media sources (Ward et al., 
2013) —and thus events over time—that are currently being coded by many large-scale event 
data projects. 
 Over the period we study (1996-2016), we demonstrate that the global diversity of 
repressive repertoires is declining (narrowing) over time, whether measured as an average of 
country-level repertoires, or as a global repertoire of all repressive events everywhere. However, 
we do find some evidence of an upward (broadening) turn since 2011. Finally, in the 
Supplemental Appendix, we also include time-series cross-section models finding that repressive 
repertoires are broader during protest and civil war, but narrower under democratic regimes and 
international human rights treaties. 
 Our approach opens new possibilities in the study of state repression, offering a 
measurement strategy well-suited to the concept of repressive diversity. We also offer a new use 
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of conflict event data, which will become even more useful as new, more detailed event datasets 
become available with future advances in machine coding resources. Our findings also contribute 
to recent debates over the changes of repression over time (Posner, 2014; Fariss, 2014; 
Cingranelli & Filippov, 2018; Fariss 2018), complementing Fariss (2014)’s findings by showing 
that, overall, states are employing less diverse repertoires of repression over time.  
 In the next section, we review the literature informing our focus on repertoires of 
repression and their diversity. We then summarize the event data that we use and explain our 
procedure for producing the measure. We next present key descriptive features of this measure 
across countries and time, and comparisons with existing measures. Finally, we discuss the 
promise of this new approach for future research. 
 
Background 
Quantitative human rights and repression scholarship, has spent the last few decades discovering 
what determines the level of human rights abuse in a country.2  The majority of those studies 
take a ‘standards-based’ approach, treating the outcome of interest as a latent concept reflecting 
the standard of human rights protection; or conversely of state repression. This approach avoids 
many concerns that arise with event-based data, such as uneven availability of information and 
the conceptual difficulty of aggregation across different event types and scales. Others measure 
and analyze repressive events directly (e.g. Harff, 2003; Eck & Hultman, 2007; Sullivan, 2016). 
 Regardless of the type of data used, nearly all research has implicitly sought to address 
whether there is more or less repression, or a better or worse standard of respect for human 





state repression, such as the diversity of state repressive repertoires, despite theoretical reasons to 
believe that diversifying one’s repressive tactics hold several advantages such as minimizing risk 
(Kydd & Walter, 2006) and innovating around obstacles (Chakrabarti, 2014). 
 This lack of attention to the diversity dimension of state repression is curious given that 
scholars often write about repertoires from the other side of the repression-dissent nexus.  Tilly 
(1986: 2) conceptualized repertoires of contention as the set of means at a challenger’s disposal 
for making claims.  These repertoires ‘provide templates for interaction, bases for collective 
memory, and switchpoints for collective struggle’ (Tilly, 2003: 46).  In this literature, while 
challengers choose from potentially rich palettes of contentious tactics, the state’s reactions 
include only prescription, toleration, or forbidding of challenger behavior.  Other scholars have 
used the repertoires of contention concept, most attributable to Tilly (Tarrow, 2008), to fruitfully 
explore social movements and contentious politics (e.g. Tarrow, 1998; Rolfe, 2005; Wada, 
2012). 
 Researchers studying violent contentious challenges have also studied factors that shape 
the repertoires of armed actors including both internal organizational dynamics (Hoover-Green, 
2016; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017) or external pressures (Horowitz, Perkoski & Potter 2017).  
Here, Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood (2017) argue patterns of violence should be studied not only 
through their frequency, but also their repertoires.3 They note that repertoires do not necessarily 
vary in correspondence to the intensity of violence, suggesting a hypothetical armed organization 
for which ‘the repertoire might be narrower, but the overall level of violence more severe, if the 
organization decided to exterminate some population rather than displace, torture, and rape them 
as before’ (23). 
	
3 They also stress the potential importance of targeting and techniques. 
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 Despite the past work on repertoires of both non-violent and violent contention, few 
scholars studying state violence towards those contenders have directly considered the idea. This 
despite McCormick & Mitchell (1997)’s warning4 against treating repression as a 
unidimensional concept.   
 Although Cingranelli & Richards (1999) made available data on human rights abuses 
disaggregated into different tactics, only a few studies leverage this granularity.  DeMeritt & 
Conrad (2019) find international shaming leads to tactic substitution, echoing arguments made 
earlier by Ron (1997, 2003) and Rejali (2009).  Fariss and Schnakenberg (2014) use network 
analysis to examine complementary and substitutive relationships among abuse types, finding the 
former to be far more frequent than the latter.5   
 While these scholars acknowledge different types of repression in their work, none offer 
a systematic way to measure diversity as an additional dimension of repression. We seek to 
advance the study of repressive repertoires by doing just that. Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood (2017) 
note concern over whether researchers can observe repertoires, given problems of data 
availability and conceptual problems of choosing the level of granularity with which to 
disaggregate violence. Yet they propose that these problems may actually be more easily 
overcome than similar challenges in measuring the frequency of violence itself.  While their 
solution is to study repertoires using detailed data from one country, compiled across multiple 
sources, we seek to develop a more general approach suitable to analysis at a global scale. 
	
4  Davenport (2007: 3) later echoed the sentiment when he called for more research acknowledging that 
“governments select from the full repertoire of coercive activities.” 
5 We remain agnostic in this debate.  Relatedly, states may build toward more violent actions in a sort of lexical 
hierarchy (we thank an anonymous reviewer for this point).  Even so, diversity of repression could decrease as states 
specialize; stay the same as they maintain a similar number of tactics further up the violence scale; or increase as 
they continue using the original tactics and add more violent ones.  Our measure could be used in future studies to 
empirically evaluate these potential progressions.	
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 Drawing from Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood (2017: 24), we conceptualize a repertoire of 
repression as the state’s ‘subset of all possible forms of violence against civilians in which it 
regularly engages.’6 That is, ‘[r]epertoires can be wide (many forms) or narrow (e.g. only 
killing)’ (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2017: 24).  Following Hoover-Green (2016: 619), we do so 
by focusing on the ‘relative proportions’ of different forms of violence. 
	
 
Developing the Measure 
To empirically assess the diversity of repressive repertoires across states, we derive a series of 
information-theoretic entropy measures from a global sample of finely disaggregated political 
event data.  Political event data denote ‘who did what to whom (and where/when)’ for a wide 
variety of event action types, including public protests, offers of mediation, suicide bombings, 
provisions of asylum, destructions of property, impositions of curfews, assassinations, violations 
of cease-fires, or mass expulsions. Alongside these action types, extensive actor designations 
allow analysts to examine state actors such as elected government officials, members of the 
judiciary, military actors, the police, and intelligence agents. Categories for nonstate actors, 
equally diverse, can encompass civilians, refugees, businesses, unions, media, religious and 
ethnic groups, and criminals. To obtain this level of detail, event data are increasingly coded 
from local and international news(wire) reports with the aid of machines. 
 The granularity in actions, actors, and spatio-temporal scales has led to the use of event 
data across many conflict research tasks encompassing both predictive (e.g. Brandt et al., 2011; 






anticipated measures, we consider one specific global event data source: the Integrated Crisis 
Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset (Boschee et al., 2015).  ICEWS is a machine-coded 
event dataset that includes intrastate and interstate interactions involving every country in the 
world aside from purely domestic US events, 1995-present.7 Coded from multilingual news 
sources, it contains fields for action type, source/target actor, date, source/target country, geo-
location, and news source, among other variables—making it one of the most comprehensive and 
accurate event datasets available (D’Orazio et al., 2011; Ward et al., 2013). 
 ICEWS designates source/target actors by ‘sectors.’ These sectors extend the CAMEO 
source/target actor hierarchy originally developed by Schrodt et al. (2009).  We use these sectors 
to subset the ICEWS data to only domestic events involving government source actors and 
civilian target actors.  Given our interest in repression, we next subset our retained events to 
encompass only those event actions considered ‘material conflict’—while also omitting CAMEO 
protest events.8 We then applied ‘one-a-day’ filtering to minimize duplicates of the same event in 
our ICEWS event data, before summing all remaining events to the country-year-action-level for 
the years 1996-2016. The Supplemental Appendix provides further details on, and robustness 
assessments of, these data aggregation decisions. 
 Together, these steps generated country-year repression event counts for every (non-US) 
country of the world during the years 1996-2016, disaggregated according to 30 CAMEO event 
categories. We report event frequencies for each repression category, and the proportion of all 
events that fall within each repression category, in Table A.I of the Supplemental Appendix.   
	
7 Our ICEWS data end in 2016 due to data availability at the time of analysis. We also omit the first year of the 
ICEWS data, 1995, from some analyses due to the lagging of a number of other variables of interest. 
8	Protest events primarily encompass citizen actions targeting the government; thus we exclude them.	
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 We represent all repression events in each country-year as a probability distribution over 
these thirty different categories of events. The measure is much less sensitive to the overall count 
of events – it reflects instead only the relative proportions of different types of events. From this 





where n is the number of different event categories present in each country-year, and p is the 
proportion of all events in that country-year comprising each category. Entropy can be calculated 
with a logarithm of any base, but using base two results in a value measured in bits.9 A coin flip 
with even probabilities thus has entropy of one, while p=(1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4) has entropy of two, 
and p=(1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8, 1/8) has entropy of three.  
 This information-theoretic measure, known as Shannon’s H, captures how much 
information can be learned about a distribution from a single randomly drawn event (Shannon 
(1948).10 In a low-entropy system, any given event is likely to be more informative than in a 
high-entropy system. Compared with other measures of diversity, such as an inverse Herfindahl 
index, entropy is less skewed and better suited for precision at high and low levels (Boydstun et 
al., 2014). This enables clearer differentiation among states with either very high or very low 
values of diversity in repressive repertoires, whereas Herfindahl indices tend to compress values 
at these extremes into less nuanced groupings.11  
	
9 This is advantageous in that bits are (1) a valid measure for time series analysis, (2) provide a principled and non-
ambiguous means for transforming information across distinct (event) sources into consistent units, and (3) represent 
a common and extendable unit of measurement in information theory (Hilbert and López 2012: 947-948).	
10 DeDeo (2018) offers an intuitive introduction. 
11 We also illustrate this via comparisons and robustness assessments involving entropy and an inverse Herfindahl 
index in our Supplemental Appendix.		
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Another useful feature of entropy is consistency under coarse-graining. As DeDeo et al. 
(2013: 2248) explain, ‘if two outcomes are grouped, then the uncertainty is the uncertainty of the 
more coarse-grained description, plus the (weighted) uncertainty of outcomes from the grouped 
category.’ This is desirable for measures of (repressive) repertoires derived from political event 
data given that the underlying event data inputs for such measures often have different (nested) 
levels of granularity in available event categories—such as the different levels of CAMEO event 
categories discussed in the Supplemental Appendix. In the Supplemental Appendix, we 
demonstrate our repression entropy measure’s robustness to different levels and choices of 
coarse-graining in the repression event categories employed. 
 
Figure 1. Example distributions with associated values of entropy 
 Figure 1 illustrates the entropy values for a series of example distributions. As the 
distribution has more possible outcomes, entropy increases, but it falls as the distribution 
becomes less even and more concentrated on one or a few possible outcomes. One limitation of 
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this measure is that it requires a sufficient number of events to be observed in the first place. An 
entropy of two, based on fifty events each of two different types, is more reliable than an entropy 
of two based on one event each of two types. Hence, in some analyses we restrict the sample to 
countries with at least some threshold number of repression events observed – most often ten.  
 
Comparisons with Existing Measures of Repression 
How does the entropy of state repressive repertoires relate to the level of repression?  Do 
repressive states forgo most tactics to perform highly repressive actions in which they specialize? 
Or do repressive states diversify their repressive repertoires? We find very clear evidence of the 
latter – more repressive governments employ more diverse repertoires. In this section, we present 
illustrative results to show this relationship.12 Figure 2 shows two plots, both with Fariss’ (2014) 
human rights scores on the x-axis (but reversed such that higher values reflect more repression) 
in order to capture existing standards-based measures of the level of repression. The first panel 
shows the logged count of repressive events on the y-axis, while the second shows our new 
entropy measure.13 In both panels, the placement of each country reflects averaged values over 
the entire observed period since 1996.  
	
12	In the Supplemental Appendix, we demonstrate this relationship holds when controlling for covariates often 
included in repression research.	
13 We present equivalent plots to Figure 2 that instead use a Goldstein scale in place of our raw counts of repressive 




Figure 2. Comparison between existing repression measure, count of state repressive events, and 
entropy of state repressive events. Each point represents the averages for each country across all 
observed years. 
 The first panel shows that, while a positive relationship exists between the level of 
repression and the count of repressive events, a great deal of unrelated variation remains. Some 
highly repressive countries have very low event counts, such as North Korea and the Central 
African Republic, suggesting limitations stemming from lack of access or lack of interest by the 
global media. This relationship also comports with the ‘more murder in the middle’ theory in 
which very autocratic governments do not actively repress because citizens do not dissent for 
fear of repercussions (Regan & Henderson, 2002). On the other hand, some much less repressive 
countries register very large event counts – such as Australia and the United Kingdom – most 
likely reflecting much greater media attention.  
The second panel, however, illustrates a very strong correspondence between the level of 
repression and the diversity of repressive repertoires, despite these two measures’ entirely 
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distinct sources and methods of construction.14 North Korea and the Central African Republic 
even appear almost precisely on the line of best fit, despite their relatively low observed event 
counts. Yet there is also interesting variation around the line of best fit, demonstrating that the 
diversity of repression remains a distinct concept. Among more repressive countries, some 
employ more diverse repertoires – such as Israel and Zimbabwe – while others employ less 
diverse repertoires – such as Burundi and Turkey. Similarly, among less repressive countries, 
some employ more diverse repertoires – such as Germany and Slovenia – while others employ 
less diverse repertoires – such as Portugal and Qatar. In the Supplemental Appendix, we find 
meaningful relationships explaining this variation, while controlling for existing standards-based 
measures.  
 We next compare the entropy of repression to both the count of repressive events, and to 
two existing measures (Fariss [2014] and the Political Terror Scale [Gibney et al., 2019]), for a 
selection of countries in order to illustrate their relative patterns over time. Entropy generally 
aligns well with existing measures, even where event counts do not. For example, Figure 3 
suggests that the event count for India rises dramatically over time, even though existing 
repression measures suggest relative stability or even a decrease. The entropy of repression, in 
turn, remains roughly stable over time as well. A similar pattern appears for many other 
countries, with event counts increasing in ways that do not reflect the consensus view of 
repression trends, whereas the diversity of repression exhibits very different—and much more 
intuitive—patterns over time. 
	
14 Although Fariss’ (2014) Human Rights Scores incorporate both standards-based and events-based data sources, 
the event sources used are not daily conflict events data like ICEWS, but rather measure the annual presence or 




Figure 3. Comparison of four measures for India, 1996-2016 (only through 2013 for Human 
Rights Scores). 
 In some cases, the entropy of repression even seems to offer substantially more 
information than existing measures, particularly around key events such as democratic 
transitions, major protests, or elections. Figure 4 shows data for Yugoslavia/Serbia, where a 
democratic transition followed the downfall of Milosevic’s repressive regime in October 2000. 
The event count alone would suggest that repression remained as intense after the transition as it 
had been in the late 1990s, which is clearly incorrect. Yet the entropy of repression falls 
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dramatically from 2000-2001 and remains at a much lower level. In fact, the diversity of 
repressive repertoires appears to respond much more rapidly to the transition than do existing 
standards-based measures.  
 
Figure 4. Comparison of four measures for Serbia, 1996-2016 (only through 2013 for Human 
Rights Scores) 
 We present several similar figures for other countries in Figures A5-A11. The diversity of 
state repressive repertoires jumps sharply in 2013 in both Turkey and Brazil, where major protest 
movements challenged both governments in that year. Yet an analysis using either event counts 
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or standards-based measures would identify a much more limited or delayed state response, or 
even none at all. Similar figures for Kenya and Iran also suggest increases in the diversity of 
state repressive repertoires during or following highly contested elections and ensuing protest 
and violence. Entropy increases sharply in Kenya in 2008 (after the 12/27/2007 presidential 
election which resulted in substantial conflict and repression) and increases in Iran’s 2005 and 
2009 presidential election years. These figures illustrate the value of studying the diversity of 
repressive repertoires as a distinct concept.  
 
Are Repertoires of Repression Growing More or Less Diverse over Time? 
Recent debates have focused on the seemingly simple, but methodologically complex, question 
of whether or not human rights are improving over time (Clark & Sikkink, 2013; Posner, 2014; 
Fariss, 2014; Sikkink, 2017; Cingranelli & Filippov, 2018; Fariss, 2018). Our approach enables 
us to ask a parallel question: Have state repertoires of repression grown more or less diverse over 
time? 
 Given that we observe individual repressive events worldwide for the period 1996-2016, 
we consider two ways to approach this question. First, we compute annual average values of 
entropy across all country-year-level observations. This, however, requires us to decide how to 
treat country-years with small numbers of observed events. Entropy estimates may be unreliable 
for country-years with relatively few events and cannot be computed at all where no events are 
observed. We thus set varying thresholds to define the sample in which to evaluate changing 
diversity of state repertoires over time. 
 Second, we ignore countries altogether, and simply compute a global value of entropy 
across all state repression events in each year, regardless of where in the world they take place. 
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This avoids the necessity of defining the sample of countries, as the entropy of all repressive 
events in the world comprise a single annual observation. However, this also has the effect of 
weighting countries with large numbers of observed events – like Australia, China, India, and 
Russia – more heavily than countries with fewer observed events, whereas the first approach 
weights each country equally, conditional on its inclusion in the sample. 
 
Figure 5. Changing average diversity of repression over time. Each panel employs a different 
sample of countries, limited either by the number of observed events, or to a stable set of 
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countries that are consistently observed with a given number of events. Vertical bars reflect 95 
percent confidence intervals. 
 Figure 5 shows the first approach, with annual average values of entropy computed 
across country-years. The top row of panels includes only observations with at least five, and at 
least ten, observed events each year. The bottom row limits the sample to those countries which 
consistently meet the five and ten event thresholds over their time-series.  In all cases, the figures 
show a declining entropy over time, consistent with state repertoires of repression growing 
narrower, not broader. In some plots, the decline levels off in years since roughly 2010. 
 
Figure 6. Changing global diversity of repression over time, based on all state repressive events 
in each year, regardless of country. Vertical bars reflect 95 percent confidence intervals, based 
on a bootstrap resampling (with replacement) from all events each year. 
 In Figure 6, we show the second approach, computing a global value of entropy across all 
repressive events in each year, regardless of the state responsible. Here, the confidence intervals 
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come from a bootstrap, resampling 1,000 times with replacement from the observed events each 
year. This figure is also consistent with a declining entropy over time, as shown by the line of 
best fit. However, there is a clear shift since 2011, with entropy values higher than the low point 
of 2010, though not as high as in the late 1990s. This difference in findings from the first 
approach is attributable to the different ways of weighting events, with the first approach 
weighting each country equally, and the second approach instead weighting each repressive 
event equally, thereby giving more emphasis to high-event-volume countries.  
 Nonetheless, despite the slightly different patterns since 2011, both approaches suggest a 
broad global pattern by which the diversity of state repressive repertoires has declined over time. 
Further, we investigate potential determinants of this global decline at the country-year level in 
the Supplemental Appendix. By including a time trend in regression models of the entropy of 
state repression, we confirm a statistically significant negative decline in the diversity of state 
repertoires of repression over time. We further find evidence suggesting that the global decline 
may be attributable to the expansion of institutions that constrain and inform, in the form of 
democratic regimes and international human rights treaties. 
 
Conclusion 
This article develops a novel means of measuring the diversity of states’ repressive repertoires.   
We do so by applying an information-theoretic entropy measure to ICEWS-derived political 
event data. For any given number of state repression events, we find that our resultant entropy 
measure of state repressive tactics ranges from small (narrow) to large (broad), and is highly 
informative. This diversity-based measure of state repressive repertoires is strongly and 
positively associated with existing measures of state repression while remaining a distinct 
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concept.  It also exhibits greater responsiveness to key external events than do existing measures. 
This suggests not only the validity of our measure, but its advantages for detecting key shifts in 
state repressive behaviors, including within tasks related to ‘conflict early warning’ and conflict 
forecasting. 
 Over the period we study, we also determine that the global diversity of repressive 
repertoires is declining (narrowing) over time, whether measured as an average of country-level 
repertoires, or as a global repertoire of all repressive events everywhere. Within the context of 
recent debates over the direction of changes in global repression over time (e.g. Posner, 2014; 
Fariss, 2014; Cingranelli & Filippov, 2018; Fariss, 2018), these findings thereby complement 
those of Fariss (2014) with a distinct concept, data source, and measurement approach. At the 
same time, we do find some evidence of an upward (broadening) turn in global repressive 
repertoires since 2011. Our Supplemental Appendix’s analyses suggest that this post-2011 global 
trend could relate to factors such as democratic reversals or eroding international norms. Future 
research should explore this further, as well as (i) the complementarity vs. substitutability of 
repression tactics and (ii) whether states shift their repertoires in response to external pressure 
from the international human rights regime or from domestic dissent.   
 Our novel use of conflict events data also has the potential to improve event data analyses 
and forecasting efforts in ways that extend beyond the study of state repression. As noted above, 
most contemporary event data aggregation approaches rely on counts of event type(s). However, 
the ever-expanding pool of available news media for event coding often ensures that count-based 
aggregations of event data must either ignore these new sources of event information or accept 
an increasing count of events over time, even where on-the-ground event levels have remained 
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constant. Our measure is less sensitive to these latter coding effects and thus is likely to be less 
biased for analyses of event data over time and within the most prominent global event datasets.  
 Finally, conceptualizing and measuring repressive repertoires offers a tool for evaluating 
the international human rights regime’s ultimate goal of reducing repression. As this regime 
gradually takes certain tactics off the table through international norms and monitoring, 
repressive states can either innovate or choose from a shrinking repertoire of tactics. Our results 
suggest that, on average, repressive states are choosing from fewer tactics over time. This 
approach may enable the detection of possible innovation by repressive states in the future – a 
useful tool in the fight for human rights. 
 
Replication Data: Replication data, analysis and formatting scripts, and an online appendix can 
be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets 
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